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I. INTRODUCTION 
In their seminal article A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout hold that the modern corporation is 
best understood in terms of team production. Challenging the principal–
agent model, and with it the shareholder primacy principle, Blair and 
Stout offer an analysis that considers the various stakeholders of the cor-
poration as members of a team. Accordingly, they suggest, the purpose 
of corporate law is to provide a response to the problems created by col-
lective production processes, in particular those pertaining to the distri-
bution of profits stemming from the cooperation. The solution to this 
problem, according to Blair and Stout, is to be found in handing over 
control of the firm to the board of directors, conceived of as a mediating 
hierarch whose responsibility is to balance the competing interests of the 
team members. The neutrality and independence of the board allow it to 
be an efficient arbiter and keep everyone sufficiently satisfied so that the 
team does not dissolve. 
While Blair and Stout’s move—away from the shareholder primacy 
model and towards an inclusive, multistakeholder conception of the 
firm—is important and desirable, it is nonetheless insufficient. Its princi-
pal weakness is that the team production model does not deal with ques-
tions of fairness in the allocation of goods within the corporation. This 
deficiency is especially striking since their perception of the firm places 
the interrelationship of team members at the heart of the corporate idea. 
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In this Article, I propose to complement Blair and Stout’s model 
with principles that will ensure not only efficient decisionmaking proce-
dures, but also fair distribution among team members. These principles, I 
suggest, may be found in John Rawls’s principles of justice that, if ap-
plied to the corporation, may serve as the framework for such a task. 
The Article begins by presenting Blair and Stout’s position in rela-
tion to the purpose of the corporation. It focuses first on the advantages 
of thinking about the corporation in terms of team production, highlight-
ing the way in which this model enables all stakeholders to be thought of 
as an organic part of the corporate body. This is followed by a discussion 
of the weakness of the Blair–Stout model, focusing on the fact that it 
does not relate to questions of distributive justice. The metaphor that I 
use to illustrate this point presents the Blair–Stout model as a Hobbesian 
model of the corporation, whereas a Rawlsian model, I argue, would be 
preferable. 
Part III clarifies the possibility of applying Rawlsian principles of 
justice to the corporation. It starts by admitting to the main difficulty of 
such a move, namely that the Rawlsian principles of justice are not 
meant to apply to private organizations such as corporations. Indeed, ac-
cording to Rawls’s “division of moral labor,” the principles of justice 
pertain only to the basic structure of society, those “public” social institu-
tions that have to do with the background conditions for justice, while 
private, individual interactions (including those of and with organizations 
such as corporations, religious institutions, universities, etc.) are not sub-
ject to these principles. In response to this, and possibly in contrast to 
Rawls’s own opinion, I propose to view corporations as part of the basic 
structure of society. By showing that corporations are major social insti-
tutions, which construct power relations, shape the public sphere, and 
allocate significant goods (surely wealth, but also self-esteem and social 
position), this Article argues that corporations meet Rawls’s criteria for 
the basic structure of society and ought to be considered as a subject of 
the principles of justice. 
After establishing that corporations should be considered as part of 
the basic structure of society, Part IV will demonstrate—in broad 
strokes—the ways in which Rawls’s principles of justice might be ap-
plied to the decisionmaking process of the board. Rather than offer a de-
tailed account of the various scenarios in which the principles of justice 
should be applied to the board’s decisionmaking process, this Part is in-
tended merely to outline the contours for the exercise of discretion within 
a just corporation. 
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II. THE TEAM PRODUCTION MODEL 
In their seminal article A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout hold that the modern corporation is 
best understood in terms of team production.1 Challenging the principal–
agent model along with the shareholder primacy principle, Blair and 
Stout offer an analysis that considers the various stakeholders of the cor-
poration as members of a team. Accordingly, the purpose of corporate 
law is to provide a response to the most difficult problem of collective 
production processes—the distribution of profits stemming from the co-
operation. 
According to Blair and Stout, team production problems arise when 
the production activity requires the combined inputs (time, money, ex-
pertise, etc.) of two or more individuals; when these inputs by team 
members are team-specific (that is, they are difficult to recover once in-
vested in the project); and when the gains from the cooperation are non-
separable (that is, it is impossible to ascribe a particular portion of the 
gains that arise from the cooperation to identifiable contributors).2 In 
such cases, Blair and Stout argue, it is very difficult to determine how the 
gains produced by the team should be divided: any ex ante rule of distri-
bution may encourage team members to shirk, as their portion of the sur-
plus has already been determined. Any ex post rule, on the other hand, 
may encourage opportunistic rent-seeking.3 Blair and Stout offer a solu-
tion to this problem: in contrast to the conservative principal–agent view, 
in which distribution of profits favors the firm’s shareholders (as the re-
sidual claimants, they are entitled to all the profits that are left after the 
corporation’s other contractual obligations have been met), Blair and 
Stout propose to hand control of the firm, including the decision of how 
to allocate profits among team members, to the board of directors. Under 
this view, the board is conceived of as a “mediating hierarch” who must 
balance the competing interests of team members. As the board itself is 
not a member of the productive team, its neutrality and independence 
allow it to arbitrate efficiently and keep everyone sufficiently satisfied so 
the team does not dissolve.4 In an important sense, the authority of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 1. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. 
L. REV. 247, 249 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Team Production]; see also Margaret M. Blair & 
Lynn A. Stout, Team Production in Business Organizations: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743, 
744–45 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Introduction]. 
 2  . Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 1; Blair & Stout, Introduction, supra note 1. 
 3. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 1, at 249. 
 4. Id. at 250–51. In fact, according to Blair and Stout, the solution of the independent board is a 
second-best solution, because the board has no direct stake in the success of the project. See id . at 
283–84. 
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board derives (conceptually if not formally) from the team members 
themselves: the team members address the distribution-of-profits prob-
lem by “voluntarily relinquishing important control rights over firm-
specific inputs and over outputs to a neutral decisionmaker who is not 
herself a member of the team,”5 as this will ensure that everyone gets (at 
least) a satisfactory portion of the profits. This solution, according to 
Blair and Stout, allows rational individuals to profit (even if not optimal-
ly) from team production by opting into an internal governance struc-
ture—the board.6 
The logic behind this move tracks the long and notable social con-
tract tradition: the team members (citizens in the social contract theory 
equivalent) forego their rights to determine the profit allocation by them-
selves, entrusting the matter to the board of directors—a mediating hier-
arch (the sovereign in the political theory parallel)—in order to make 
sure that the allocation of profits furthers the interests of individual team 
members. As Blair and Stout note: 
In essence, the mediating hierarchy solution requires team members 
to give up important rights . . . to a legal entity created by the act of 
incorporation.7 
. . . . 
[Team members] realize that it is in their own self-interest to create 
a higher authority—a hierarch—that can limit shirking and deter 
rent-seeking behavior among team members. In other words, team 
members submit to hierarchy not for the hierarch’s benefit, but for 
their own.8 
The model of the board-as-mediating-hierarch can be specifically traced 
to the Hobbesian idea of the social contract: 
This basic idea [of a mediating authoritative hierarch] is central to 
much modern political theory, and can be traced back at least to 
Thomas Hobbes. . . . Hobbes’s notion that people might submit 
themselves to a coercive monarch in order to avoid the “warre of 
every one against every one,” . . . focuses on horizontal relation-
ships that are perhaps better described as “team destruction” rather 
than “team production.” His proposed solution parallels our own, 
however.9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 5. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 1, at 255. 
 6. Blair & Stout, Introduction, supra note 1, at 752. 
 7. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 1, at 250 (emphasis in the original). 
 8. Id. at 274 (emphasis added). 
 9. Id. at 274 n.58 (internal citation omitted). 
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As is the case with Hobbes’s sovereign, so too with Blair and 
Stout’s board, there are only minimal guidelines as to how its discretion 
is to be exercised. Indeed, much as Hobbes suffices with setting only 
threshold limitations on the sovereign’s discretion (the sovereign may 
not infringe upon basic human rights), Blair and Stout hold that the board 
should be permitted as much room for judgment as possible. Its duty to 
maximize shareholder profits (according to the conservative principal–
agent account) is thereby replaced by a duty to profit the corporation it-
self, as an independent entity. But there are no guidelines as to how the 
rents, once obtained, are to be divided between team members. This, I 
argue, is the model’s weakness: the absence of any such rules exposes 
the board’s decisionmaking process to political power relations between 
the different groups within the corporate team. Blair and Stout 
acknowledge: 
From an efficiency perspective, all that is required to protect team 
production is that the board make sure each member of the team re-
ceives enough . . . that he or she remains willing to stay in the team. 
Beyond that minimum, the question of who gets what portion of the 
corporate surplus may be determined simply by relative political 
power.10 
In my view, this poses difficult problems of distributive justice to 
the team production model. Because there is no positive account of the 
responsibility of the board to the less powerful groups within the team, 
its decisionmaking process is susceptible to political pressures exerted by 
the better-off groups. Indeed, while the team production model holds 
much promise in that it considers the interaction between team members 
as the fundamental feature of the firm, rejecting the idea that one 
group—the shareholders—are the firm’s owners and enabling it to con-
sider all stakeholders as an organic part of the corporate body, it nonethe-
less lacks distributive guidelines as to how the revenues ought to be fair-
ly divided among the contributors to the production. 
Importantly, this weakness of the team production model compro-
mises its progressive promise: the move away from the shareholder pri-
macy model and towards a stakeholder view of the corporation may 
prove futile if the actual discretion of boards is biased towards the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 10. Blair & Stout, Introduction, supra note 1, at 747 (emphasis added). See also Blair & Stout, 
Team Production, supra note 1, at 282 (“[T]he mediating hierarchy model does not imply that all the 
individuals and groups that make firm-specific investment in a public corporation will receive equal, 
or fair, shares of the surplus generated from team production. It is important that each team member 
whose firm-specific investment is essential to the corporate enterprise receive at least some portion 
of the economic surplus . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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stronger groups within the team. By exposing the board’s decisionmak-
ing process to political pressures, without providing any distributive jus-
tice principles to guide rent allocation and mitigate the power gaps be-
tween the different groups of the team, the mediating hierarch solution 
practically revalidates the status quo.11 Due to this failure to provide a 
just vision of how the board should exercise discretion regarding rent 
allocation, the team production model may offer an efficient framework 
to think about corporations, but it lacks fairness.12 The next Part of this 
Article proposes to complement Blair and Stout’s model with principles 
that will ensure not only efficient decisionmaking procedures, but also 
fair distribution among team members. These principles, I suggest, may 
be found in John Rawls’s principles of justice that, if applied to the cor-
poration, may serve as the framework for such a task. 
III. RAWLSIAN PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND CORPORATIONS 
Moving away from the Hobbesian social contract view to a more 
progressive idea, this Article proposes to think about the corporation 
within the framework of the Rawlsian theory of justice.13 Thus, instead 
of permitting the board’s discretion to be exposed to Hobbesian-like 
power struggles between the different groups within the team, the 
Rawlsian theory applies Rawls’s principles of justice as a constraint on 
the board’s decisionmaking process. Rawls’s principles of justice, if ap-
plied to the corporation (specifically to the board’s decisionmaking pro-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 11. Vis-à-vis most other groups (employees, suppliers, the local community, etc.), the strongest 
group would most likely be shareholders. This is because relative to other groups within the corpora-
tion, shareholders’ team-specific investment in the project is relatively loose; they are legally author-
ized to elect and dismiss the board and may use this power to influence its decisions; and they pos-
sess the legal authority to file derivative suits against management’s breach of fiduciary duty on 
behalf of the corporation. For a discussion of the relative strength of shareholders in the American 
context, see, for example, Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Au-
tonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 
129 (2009). Shareholders are also a relatively strong group outside the corporation. As Bratton and 
Wachter’s research on shareholders shows, “[t]he model shareholder . . . is rich, old, and white. It 
follows that there is nothing inherently democratic or progressive about the shareholder interest in 
corporate politics.” William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 489, 491 (2009). 
 12. It should be noted that it was expressly never Blair and Stout’s intention to engage with 
issues of fairness. It is this choice, however, rather than some specific position on the matter, that 
this Article criticizes. 
 13. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls develops two principles of justice: the principle of basic 
equal liberty, and the difference principle, combined with the demand of equal opportunity. See 
generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE]. 
Both principles will be discussed more fully in the next Part of the Article. The last Part of the Arti-
cle evaluates the possible implications of applying Rawls’s principles of justice to the board’s deci-
sionmaking process. 
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cess), will restrain the board’s ability to act in favor of the stronger 
groups in the team, ensuring that the distribution of goods among team 
members is carried out according to just principles. 
Importantly, the team production model naturally fits the Rawlsian 
analysis of the responsibilities that arise from social cooperation. Where-
as a contractualist view of the corporation views the firm as a sphere of 
voluntary agreements between different free and equal agents (share-
holders, employees, suppliers, customers, etc.), the team production view 
stresses the unique framework of the team and the team-specific invest-
ment of each member. Arguing that the core feature of the corporation 
lies not in any of its voluntary aspects, but rather in the entanglement of 
nonhierarchical commitments of different persons to a joint effort and the 
participation of various members, who (especially after joining the pro-
ject) are in a sense locked-in, allows us to better consider the real, some-
times involuntary, influences that corporations have on the allocation of 
social benefits. This view is well suited to the Rawlsian vision of society 
as a cooperative scheme “in which the main political and social institu-
tions of a society fit together into one system of social coopera-
tion . . . .”14 In response to the problems regarding the distribution of 
profits stemming from social cooperation, both Blair and Stout and 
Rawls, respectively, aim to ascertain the way in which social institutions 
“assign basic rights and duties and regulate the division of the ad-
vantages that arises from social cooperation over time . . . .”15 These sig-
nificant similarities—the framework of cooperation and the centrality of 
distribution of gains that arise from the cooperation—make Rawls’s 
analysis of cooperative systems and the principles of just distribution a 
natural complement to the team production model. 
To establish whether or not this move is possible or even desirable, 
however, it is necessary first to consider whether Rawls’s principles of 
justice apply to corporations. The difficulty with this suggestion stems 
from Rawls’s own view, according to which the principles of justice ap-
ply only to the institutions of the “basic structure of society,” but are not 
directly applicable to private organizations. This is Rawls’s famous “di-
vision of moral labor” between public and private, according to which 
the demands of justice are only appropriate for social institutions, while 
individuals and private associations are left free to pursue their own per-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 14. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 10 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) [hereinaf-
ter RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS]. 
 15. Id. 
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sonal ends and expected only to support the basic structure.16 “Since Jus-
tice as Fairness starts with the special case of the basic structure,” Rawls 
explains, “its principles regulate this structure and do not apply directly 
to or regulate internally institutions and associations within society. 
Firms and labor unions, churches, universities and the family [are only 
indirectly bound by] just background institutions.”17 According to Rawls, 
then, corporations belong to the latter, private sphere, and are therefore 
not directly subject to the principles of justice.18 
While extremely influential, Rawls’s division of moral labor has al-
so been widely criticized. G.A. Cohen has argued that Rawls’s principles 
of justice should regulate individual conduct as well as institutional de-
sign.19 In a similar vein, Liam Murphy claims that political justice and 
personal ethics should not be viewed as two distinct spheres, because 
justice should be considered “a collective obligation, one that we must 
shoulder together.”20 According to Murphy, Rawls’s “division of moral 
labor” hinders this idea.21 
While Cohen and Murphy contest the very distinction between po-
litical justice and personal ethics, Susan Moller Okin and others have 
argued against the non-inclusion of institutions such as the family within 
the basic structure of society, thus leaving it outside the direct application 
of the principles of justice.22 Because, according to Okin, the family is 
central to gender-structured social roles and is currently a social platform 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 16. “The principles of justice for institutions must not be confused with the principles which 
apply to individuals and their actions in particular circumstances. These two kinds of principles 
apply to different subjects and must be discussed separately.” RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra 
note 13, at  54–55. 
 17. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 14, at 10. 
 18. According to Rawls, we are looking for “an institutional division of labor between the basic 
structure and the rules applying directly to individuals and associations and to be followed by them 
in particular transactions. If this division of labor can be established, individuals and associations are 
then left free to advance their ends more effectively within the framework of the basic structure, 
secure in the knowledge that elsewhere in the social system the necessary corrections to preserve 
background justice are being made.” JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 268–69 (Columbia Univ. 
Press 1996) (1993). 
 19. G. A. COHEN, IF YOU’RE AN EGALITARIAN, HOW COME YOU’RE SO RICH? 134–42 (2000). 
 20. Liam B. Murphy, Institutions and the Demands of Justice, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251, 291 
(1998). Murphy argues that “we should not think of legal, political, and other social institutions as 
together constituting a separate normative realm, requiring separate normative first principles, but 
rather primarily as the means that people employ the better to achieve their collective political/moral 
goals.” Id. at 253. 
 21. See id. at 259. 
 22. SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND FAMILY 89–109 (1989). 
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for gender-based inequalities, the application of the principles of justice 
to families is necessary.23 
Similar to Okin’s argument that principles of justice should be ap-
plied to families, this Article proposes that the corporation—given its 
extremely influential position in today’s societies—should be considered 
part of the basic structure of society. For this purpose, the next Part of the 
Article will first review Rawls’s definition of the basic structure of socie-
ty. It will then argue—by showing that contemporary corporations are 
major social institutions, which construct power relations, shape the pub-
lic sphere, and allocate significant goods—that corporations meet 
Rawls’s criteria for the basic structure of society, and are therefore sub-
ject to the principles of justice. After establishing that corporations 
should be considered as part of the basic structure of society, the Article 
will demonstrate—in broad strokes—the ways in which Rawls’s princi-
ples of justice might apply to the decisionmaking process of the board. 
IV. CORPORATIONS AND THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY 
A. The Basic Structure of Society 
Rawls defines the basic structure of society as follows: 
The primary subject of justice is the basic structure of a society . . . 
[that is,] the way in which the major social institutions distribute 
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of ad-
vantages from social cooperation. . . . [T]he major institutions de-
fine men’s rights and duties and influence their life prospects, what 
they can expect to be and how they can hope to do. The basic struc-
ture is the primary subject of justice because its effects are so pro-
found and present from the start.24 
Among the institutions that Rawls includes in the basic structure of 
society is the political constitution with an independent judiciary and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 23. Id. Rawls addresses Okin’s critique and discusses the possibility of considering the family 
as part of the basic structure of society. See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 14, at 162–
168. 
 24. RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 7. A later version of the definition appears 
in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, and reads as follows:  
The basic structure of a society is the way in which the main political and social institu-
tions of a society fit together into one system of social cooperation, and the way they as-
sign basic rights and duties and regulate the division of advantages that arise from social 
cooperation over time. . . . The basic structure is the background social framework within 
which the activities of associations and individuals take place. A just basic structure se-
cures what we may call background justice.  
RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 14, at 10 (emphasis added). 
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legally recognized forms of property, as well as the ownership of produc-
tion and the structure of the economy.25 Corporations, as private volun-
tary associations, are not included.26 
According to Rawls, the basic structure of society is the way in 
which the principal political and social institutions allot basic rights and 
duties and regulate the distribution of benefits that accrue from social 
cooperation over the course of time. These institutions should be consid-
ered as the basic structure of society, and therefore as the subject of jus-
tice, because they play a central role in assigning rights and duties in so-
ciety. If applied fairly, these institutions produce a just distribution of 
social benefits. If we accept Rawls’s definition of the basic structure, and 
because (as illustrated below) corporations have a structural, systemic, 
and lasting influence on the distribution of social benefits in society, the 
inescapable conclusion is that corporations ought to be considered a part 
of the basic structure of society, which makes them the proper subject of 
justice.  
B. Corporations as Part of the Basic Structure of Society 
The past few decades have witnessed the multifaceted empower-
ment of transnational corporations. This rise in power is not anecdotal, 
but transformative, making large corporations a part of the basic struc-
ture of society in the Rawlsian sense. 
The rise in corporate power is ubiquitous: economically, for exam-
ple, the net worth of assets owned by large multinationals exceeds the 
gross national product (GNP) of most of the world’s countries.27 Similar-
ly, the income of these corporations exceeds the budgets of most sover-
eign states (66 of the world’s 100 largest economies are corporate enti-
ties).28 Naturally, this economic power translates into significant social 
and political power,29 leading researchers to argue that the market is now 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 25. See generally sources cited supra note 24. 
 26. Some authors have argued that while Rawls’s omission of corporations from the basic 
structure might indeed be a matter of principle, it may also result from the fact that, writing in the 
1970s, Rawls was assuming a strong welfare state. Sandrine Blanc & Ismael Al-Amoudi, Corporate 
Institutions on a Weakened Welfare State: A Rawlsian Perspective, 23 BUS. ETHICS Q. 497 (2013). 
 27. John Christopher Anderson, Respecting Human Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike 
Out, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 463, 505 (2000). 
 28. E. Bookspan, I. Hahn & G. Roth, The Giant and His Garden: On Companies, Company 
Laws, and Environmental Quality, 13 MISHPAT VEASAKIM (Law & Business) 157 n.16 (2010) (Isr.) 
(citing BRIAN ROACH, CORPORATE POWER IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2007)). 
 29. One of the important channels of political power is lobbying. On the scope of this phenom-
enon and the threats it holds for democracy, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY 
CORRUPTS CONGRESS AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011). Following the Citizens United ruling by the 
Supreme Court, holding that the government cannot curb political spending by corporations, predic-
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more important than states.30 Corporate power also has a striking poten-
tial to affect the environment and cause environmental damage. One 
stark example of this potential is the oil leak from an offshore British 
Petroleum rig in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, which caused the most se-
vere ecological disaster the United States had experienced in the past 
decades.31 
Corporate strength, however, manifests itself not only in economic, 
political, or environmental power, but also in additional, often covert, 
ways that corporations effectively shape the public sphere, influencing 
the most basic characteristics of people’s lives. It is this type of structural 
influence—rather than random or sporadic—that remains unaddressed 
under today’s understanding of the corporate idea. Consider the follow-
ing two examples of two central issues—the labor market, and the status 
of women in society—that indicate the complex and profound impact 
that corporate “private” power has on our lives. 
With regard to the labor market, some 38% of U.S. private sector 
employees are employed by large businesses.32 Large corporations, then, 
employ over one-third of the country’s workforce.33 In the United States, 
the top ten largest corporations employ close to 5% of the labor force.34 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
tions are that corporate money will be even more heavily funneled into politics. President Obama, 
for instance, responded to the ruling by saying that the decision is “a major victory for big oil, Wall 
Street banks, health insurance companies and the other powerful interests that marshal their power 
every day in Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans.” Adam Liptak, Justices 5-
4, Reject Corporate Spending Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A1; see also Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). The political influence of the large corporations on 
developing countries is even greater. See generally Steven A. Ratner, Corporations and Human 
Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001). 
 30. See, e.g., SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE 
WORLD ECONOMY 16–43 (1996). 
 31. For a detailed report prepared on the failures that lead to the catastrophe, see DEEPWATER 
HORIZON STUDY GRP., FINAL REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE MANCONDO WELL BLOWOUT 
(2011), available at http://ccrm.berkeley.edu/pdfs_papers/bea_pdfs/DHSGFinalReport-March2011-
tag.pdf. 
 32. Defined by the Small Business Administration (SBA) as organizations with over 500 em-
ployees. See SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2014). Importantly, the 
definition of “small business” by the SBA is considered by some as overly inclusive, as it considers 
firms with fewer than 500 employees to be small, placing almost every business in the United States 
within the category. “A more strict definition of small business, using a limit of 50 employees,” 
would cut back their share to less than a third of the workforce. The share of large corporations 
correspondingly rises. See J.D. Harrison, Who Actually Creates Jobs: Start-ups, Small Businesses or 
Big Corporations, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-small 
-business/who-actually-creates-jobs-start-ups-small-businesses-or-big-corporations/2013/04/24/d37 
3ef08-ac2b-11e2-a8b9-2a63d75b5459_story.html. 
 33. Harrison, supra note 32. 
 34. See Alexander E.M. Hess, The 10 Largest Employers in America, USA TODAY (Aug. 22, 
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/08/22/ten-largest-employers/2680249/. 
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The Israeli labor market is similar: large employers (defined as those 
with more than 100 workers) employ some 45% of all those employed in 
the private labor market in Israel, which constitutes about 80% of the 
country’s labor force.35 This means that great power is concentrated in 
the hands of the large private employers. The significance of this power 
runs rather deep: it is the power that shapes the most basic characteristics 
of how we work, where we work, and how much we get paid for doing 
work. 
Think, for example, of the standards of remuneration in the private 
market, and especially the high-manager’s versus worker’s salary ratio. 
While most of the employees in the top U.S. companies earn less than 
$10 an hour, the wages of senior management are many times that.36 For 
instance, the highest paid manager at Wal-Mart—the largest single pri-
vate sector employer in the United States with 1.4 million employees in 
the United States alone—earned a salary of $18.4 million in 2012.37 The 
ratio between the CEO’s wages and that of average-earning workers at 
Wal-Mart stands, then, at 1034:1. At Target and McDonalds, the third 
and sixth largest employers in the United States, respectively, the ratio is 
597:1 and 434:1.38 This type of employment pattern radiates over the 
entire economy and fashions its accepted norms. According to census 
data from 2009–2011 compiled by the National Employment Law Pro-
ject, 66% of low-wage workers in the United States are employed by 
large businesses with over 100 employees.39 As noted above, most of 
them do not make as much as $10 per hour. Indeed, the division of 
wealth in Western society has for some time been tilted in favor of the 
capital owners and high earners, and this is largely the result of corporate 
norms.40 According to Pickety, the pace of this distortion is intensify-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 35. See Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Businesses, by Economic Sector and Size Groups of 
Average Salaried Positions Per Employer, 62 STAT. ANN. 770, Table 18.3 (2011), available at 
http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/. 
 36. George Zornick, Large, Profitable Companies Employ Most Minimum-Wage Earners, THE 
NATION (July 19, 2012, 5:21 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/168969/large-profitable-
companies-employ-most-minimum-wage-earners#. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Putting CEO Pay in Perspective, PAYSCALE, http://www.payscale.com/data-packages/ 
ceo-income (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). See also Alexander E.M. Hess, The 10 Largest Employers 
in America, USA TODAY (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/08/ 
22/ten-largest-employers/2680249/. 
 39. Zornick, supra note 36 (large business is defined in this census as a business with 100 
employees or more). 
 40. Indeed, corporate managers are usually not referred to as “capital owners.” However, since 
much of top managerial income in public corporations tends to accrue from shares and other forms 
of stock price linked compensation (e.g., options), I include top managers in the category of capital 
owners as well as in that of high earners. I thank Marc Moore for pointing that out to me. 
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ing.41 In the United Kingdom, for example, while the average salaries of 
wage earners in the private market are declining, the salaries of senior 
managers are on the rise.42 These practices undoubtedly have a huge im-
pact on our societies, from economic disparities to the very concept of 
human worth. These cannot be attributed to voluntary agreements in any 
simple sense. Rather, it is a clear indication that corporate decisionmak-
ing processes are the province of “major social institutions” that “deter-
mine the division of advantages from social cooperation” in the Rawlsian 
sense.43 
This influence of the corporate private sector on the labor market is 
not limited to the form of employment; rather, there are far-reaching im-
plications for other key areas of public life. Think, for example, of the 
status of women in the labor market, particularly in senior positions, 
which is similarly determined by private practices. The fact that women 
occupy only 14%–15% of executive positions in Fortune 500 compa-
nies,44 or that women hold only 18% of senior managerial positions in 
the private sector in Israel,45 is to a great extent the result of private sec-
tor decisionmaking. This does not only “influence [women’s] life pro-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 41. THOMAS PICKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 296–97 (Arthur Gold-
hammer trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2014). 
 42. See Prem Sikka, Squeezing Ordinary People’s Finance Always Leads to Disaster, THE 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/apr/23/squeezing-
ordinary-people-finances. The trend in Israel is the same: the wages of salaried employees have been 
eroded in recent years; according to a report by Israel’s Security and Exchange Commission that 
examines salary trends for senior office holders in stock-exchange-traded companies, the average 
salary of senior managers in these companies has almost doubled in the past decade. See ISRAEL 
SEC, THE SALARIES OF SENIOR MANAGERS: A PICTURE OF THE SITUATION AND TRENDS, 2003–
2009 (Hebrew), available at http://www.isa.gov.il/GeneralResearch/3304/Documents/IsaFile_ 
5029.pdf. In addition, statistics published in the newspaper The Marker show that the salary of the 
highest paid 100 senior managers of stock-exchange-traded companies in 2011 was seventy-nine 
times that of the average salary in the market and that the gaps were only growing wider; in 2010, it 
was seventy-seven times greater. Lior Zeno, 79 Times the Average Wage, THE MARKER (Apr. 3. 
2012), http://www.themarker.com/markets/1.1678124. The findings of the Calcalist newspaper also 
show the wage gaps between managers of companies in Israel and the average salary in their compa-
nies. CALCALIST, SALARIES CONTINUE TO RISE, ALONG WITH WAGE GAPS (2011), available at 
http://go.calcalist.co.il/pic//contralmanager/040312.pdf. A proposed law on limiting the salaries of 
senior company officers, in an attempt to narrow these gaps for public companies, has lain dormant 
in the Israeli Knesset for several years. The last proposal in this spirit, seeking to limit the ratio to 
fifty times, was rejected in May 2012. Zvi Zarakhia, Vote on Senior Managers’ Salary Rejected: 
Kadima Party Changes Stand, THE MARKER (May 23, 2012), http://www.themarker.com/career/ 
1.1714828. 
 43. See RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 7. 
 44. RACHEL SOARS & LIZ MULLIGAN-FERRY, CATALYST, 2013 CATALYST CENSUS: FORTUNE 
500 WOMEN EXECUTIVE OFFICERS AND TOP EARNERS (2013), available at 
http://www.catalyst.org/system/files/2013_catalyst_census_fortune_500_women_executive_officers
_top_earners.pdf. 
 45. Tomer Zarchin, Without Favors, Without Discrimination, HAARETZ, May 20, 2012 (Isr.).    
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spects, what they can expect to be and how well they can hope to do,”46 
but shapes our societal concepts of the proper balance between work and 
home, thus not only shaping the work environment within companies, 
but affecting women’s position in society more generally.47 
Consider the following example: in 2011, the Israeli Center for 
Transplants launched a campaign in the media and on posters on buses to 
encourage people to sign donor cards for organ transplants.48 The posters 
presented men, women, and children who had signed such a donor 
card.49  The Canaan Transport Advertising and Marketing Company, 
which was running the campaign on behalf of the bus companies, chose 
to refrain from presenting women’s images in the Jerusalem campaign, 
fearing the rage of ultraorthodox groups in the city, who consider the 
portrayal of women in public indecent. This step drew wide condemna-
tion in the press and among the public because it overlooked women, 
making women irrelevant to the public sphere. A newspaper piece on the 
matter read as follows: “In recent years, the exclusion of women from 
the public space in Jerusalem has grown worse, and become an outra-
geous norm. [It now involves] the disappearance of any trace of the fem-
inine sex. . . . Commercial companies who cooperate are complaisant 
with this phenomenon.”50 A Jerusalem nonprofit organization and several 
of the city’s citizens appealed against Egged Israel Transport Coopera-
tive Society Ltd., the bus company, and Canaan Co., arguing that the ex-
clusion of women from advertising boards constituted an infringement of 
the basic principles of equality, human dignity, and freedom of political 
expression.51 In response to the appeal, Egged—the largest bus company 
in the country—argued that, as a private body, it is not committed to 
public law principles of equality.52 The case is still pending, but the ap-
peal’s chances of success seem to be rather slim, as the Israeli Supreme 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 46. RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 7. 
 47. In the Israeli private sector, women compose 47% of all workers, but this rate becomes 
smaller as their rank increases. Thus, 34% of the women are in junior management positions, where-
as only 18% hold senior management positions. Zarchin, supra note 45. 
 48. Tamar Rotem, Back to the Days When Women Were Seen in Jerusalem, HAARETZ (Nov. 
11, 2011) (Isr.), http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/education/1.1711620. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. A previous appeal filed against the Egged and Canaan companies, which dealt with the 
exclusion of a female contender for the Jerusalem City Council from similar ad posters, was settled 
out of court. See HCJ, 9460/08, Jerusalem Revival List v. Chair of the Central Elections Committee 
et al. (Published in Nevo, Nov. 10, 2008) (Isr.). 
 52. Relying on 30188/02 Hevrat Ha-Shmira Ltd. V. The State of Israel, Ministry of Transporta-
tion (June 3rd 2002).  
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Court has previously ruled that the same bus company is not a “state ac-
tor” in the proper sense.53 
As these examples illustrate, large corporations possess immense 
life-shaping power. Under the veil of “voluntary private associations,” 
they generate practices that shape our identities and influence our most 
significant circles of belonging. In real life, large corporations are, to 
quote Rawls on the characteristics of the basic structure, “social institu-
tions [that] distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the 
division of advantages from social cooperation.”54 Their “effects are so 
profound and present,” their significant distributive social role not short 
of that of the welfare state,55 that they ought to be included in the basic 
structure of society.56 
C. A Theory of the Just Corporation 
Having established the plausibility of considering large corpora-
tions as part of the basic structure of society and subject to Rawls’s prin-
ciples of justice, we now turn to examining the implications of this move 
for the nature of the corporation. The aim of the discussion here is to 
sketch, even if in broad strokes, the ways in which Rawls’s principles of 
justice might apply to the decisionmaking process of the board, ensuring 
that the process is not exposed to political power struggles between the 
different team members, but rather confined to guidelines of fair distribu-
tion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 53. In Israel, the application of administrative law norms to private bodies is made possible by 
the “dual-essence” doctrine, which deems private bodies to be “dual-essence” bodies to which “nor-
mative duality” applies: public law on the one hand, and private law on the other. Among the criteria 
set down by the courts to declare “dual essence” are private bodies with an affinity to a public au-
thority or bodies that operate according to a state franchise; bodies that fulfill central public func-
tions or supply a vital product; bodies having a monopolistic position; and so on. Accordingly, Israe-
li law recognizes bodies such as the Electricity Company, the National Burial Services Company, 
etc., as bodies of dual essence, and imposes public law duties upon them. 
 54. RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 7. 
 55. David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation, 
107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139 (2013). 
 56. In the same  context, see Naomi Klein’s argument according to which, on top of the appar-
ent aspects of shaping people’s consumerist habits, corporations have gained a deep influence over 
how individuals form their self-perception, primarily as consumers. It is difficult to overstate this 
point: since culture—in the broad sense—is central to the fashioning of human consciousness and 
behavior, the bodies that dominate the shaping of cultural codes and accepted norms of conduct have 
substantial influence in shaping the nature of public life more generally. Possessing immense power 
in the shaping and reproduction of culture, large corporations are therefore central constructors of 
reality itself. In this sense as well, they ought to be regarded as part of the basic social structure. See 
generally NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO (1999). 
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According to Rawls’s first principle of justice, every person has the 
same claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which is 
compatible with the same scheme for all. The second principle is com-
prised of two subconditions: (1) social and economic inequalities attach 
to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity (the equal opportunity requirement); and (2) social and eco-
nomic inequalities are allowed only for the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged members of society (the difference principle).57 
As Rawls explains, the first principle is prior to the second princi-
ple. Within the second principle, the equal opportunity requirement pre-
cedes the difference principle. Priority means that, in applying a princi-
ple, we assume that the requirements of the previous principle are fully 
satisfied.58 
1. Rawls’s First Principle of Justice: Equal Liberties 
Among the basic liberties that the first principle warrants, mandat-
ing the same scheme of equal liberties for all, Rawls enumerates the 
freedom of thought and conscience, the right to life and bodily integrity, 
and the political liberties—such as the freedom of association, the right 
to vote and to participate in the polity, etc. Just institutions, according to 
Rawls, have a duty to protect and support these rights and freedoms of 
parties to the cooperative scheme.59 
When we translate that notion from the political sphere to the cor-
porate environment, it is possible to think of a duty of the board to not 
hamper the freedom of employees to unionize. In the same way that the 
institutions of the polity must, under a Rawlsian scheme, uphold the 
freedom of persons to freely associate (even if this duty may place a bur-
den, economic or other, upon the polity), the board’s decisionmaking 
must respect the parallel freedom of employees to unionize, even at a 
cost. 
An Israeli case60 concerning unionization of workers at a cellphone 
company illustrates this point. In 2012, a group of employees at Pele-
phone Inc., one of Israel’s largest phone companies, decided to unionize 
in order to improve their terms of employment. In response, the board 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 57. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 14, at 42. 
 58. Id. at 43. 
 59. Id. at 46, 47–48 (“We see the basic structure of society as having two coordinate roles, the 
first principle applying to one, the second principle to the other. . . . In one role, the basic structure 
specifies and secures citizens’ equal liberties.”). 
 60. See File No. 25476-09-12 National Labour Court of Israel, The Histadrut (Workers Union) 
v. Pelephone Communications Ltd. (2013) (Isr.). 
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and senior management of the company instructed individual employees 
not to join the union, had employees sign affidavits stating they would 
not do so, and addressed employees collectively in order to deter them 
from joining the union, calling it a “political cancer” and hinting that un-
ionization would result in massive layoffs.61 The union filed suit against 
the firm’s conduct, arguing that it infringed on the workers’ right to un-
ionize, which is safeguarded under Israeli labor law.62 Balancing the 
right to unionize against the right of employers to free speech, the court 
concluded that due to the gap in bargaining power between employers 
and employees, the employer should remain passive with regard to the 
unionization process of the firm’s workers.63 
Applying Rawls’s principles of justice to the Pelephone Inc. 
board’s decisionmaking process may have resulted in a different scenario 
altogether. According to Rawls’s first principle of justice—the equal lib-
erties principle, translated from the political sphere to the corporate do-
main—the board may have a duty to respect the workers’ freedom of 
association. This means that, even at a cost to other interest groups with-
in the firm,64 the board cannot pressure employees into relinquishing 
their right to join the union or imply that joining the union may be peri-
lous to their future employment with the firm. 
The American National Labor Act strikes the balance between the 
employees’ right to unionize and the employers’ freedom of expression 
to accommodate the employers’ interests. Section c(8) states: 
The expressing of any views, argument or opinion, or the dissemi-
nation thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic form, shall not 
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the 
provisions of this Act, if such an expression contains no threat of 
reprisal or force or promise of benefit.65 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 61. Id. 
 62. See Israeli Collective Agreements Act, 5717–1957, 11 LSI 221 (1957) (Isr.). 
 63. See File No. 25476-09-12 National Labour Court of Israel, The Histadrut (Workers Union) 
v. Pelephone Communications Ltd. (2013) (Isr.). 
 64. Preventing workers from unionizing is usually linked to an alleged increase in profits as the 
bargaining power of the workers decreases, which results both in poorer working conditions and in 
the ability to fire. Numerous cases have shown that in cases where the firm’s performance has been 
slower than before (reflected in less profit rather than in losses), it is the board’s practice to fire 
employees and keep the expected gains higher, thus preferring the interests of shareholders over 
those of the workers. This practice seems to be contrary to a fair distribution of benefits within the 
firm, and the suggested subjection of the board to the Rawlsian principles of justice may help to 
prevent it. 
 65. 29 U.S.C. § 158c(4) (2014). 
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The Act seems to suggest that the realization of the employees’ 
right to unionize is thought of in terms of a “free market of ideas,” where 
both employers and employees may voice their respective opinions. This 
view had been criticized as undermining the very purpose of the Act and 
as disregarding the inherent gaps in the bargaining power of employees 
and employers.66 
In its current form, the team production model cannot alter this un-
just outcome. It does not address how the relatively weaker team mem-
bers—the workers—can be empowered to act collectively to counterbal-
ance the power of a stronger employer, as the board’s decisions respond 
only to political power relations between various team members. In this 
case as well, the mediating hierarch solution reaffirms the status quo. 
The position advanced in this Article may remedy this problem, by ex 
ante preventing such situations: the board would be obligated, from the 
outset, to consider the interests of all of the team members according to 
just principles. Assigning the board with a duty to support the workers’ 
freedom of association—a result of the Rawlsian first principle of jus-
tice—will ensure that a fairer balance is struck between the competing 
interests of the team’s groups, and favoring the interests of shareholders 
over those of employees will no longer be the default choice. 
Integrating Rawls’s first principle of justice into the corporate deci-
sionmaking procedure may also imply some form of workplace democ-
racy. As mentioned above, according to Rawls’s principle of equal liber-
ties, one of the basic liberties that just institutions must support is the 
right to meaningful political participation.67 Applied to the corporation, 
this would suggest that other team members, primarily workers, should 
take part—in some form or other—in the management of the firm. 
Workplace democracy and participation of workers in managerial deci-
sions have been widely discussed in other contexts and are most com-
monly referred to as “the parallel case argument.”68 It runs as follows: In 
the political sphere, the grounds for democratic participation in govern-
ment are that the polity is a cooperative scheme for the mutual benefit of 
its members, which is governed by public rules. Thus, everyone that is 
expected to contribute to the scheme, and is subject to its rules, is entitled 
to participate in determining these rules.69 Since corporations are also 
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 67  . RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 14, at 45–46. 
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cooperative schemes, so the argument runs, it makes sense that work-
ers—as contributing team members—should likewise be entitled to some 
form of workplace participation. 
Within the team production model of the corporation, this analysis 
seems natural. By rejecting the principal–agent view, the team produc-
tion model stresses the cooperative aspects of the team, focusing on the 
integrated contribution of each team member and, therefore, on team 
members’ expectations of being “counted.” This framework traces 
Rawls’s vision of cooperative schemes and the significance of members’ 
participation. The team production model therefore seems to naturally 
lend itself to Rawls’s first principle of justice, which reflects the very 
same conception of the cooperative qualities in society. 
2. Rawls’s Second Principle of Justice: Equal Opportunity and the  
Difference Principle 
(a). Equal Opportunity 
Rawls’s principle of equal opportunity is meant to prevent inequali-
ties that emerge over time in a cooperative system. The idea is that even 
when the initial scheme is fair, different natural circumstances and con-
tingent individual decisionmaking may generate gaps in wealth, property, 
or other goods or resources between persons. The worry is that these 
gaps in and of themselves will foster unfair advantages for those who 
enjoy the better positions, while others’ starting points will become rela-
tively inferior.70 For this reason, Rawls argues, it is necessary to ensure 
that the background institutions are supporting a policy of fair equal op-
portunity: “Supposing that there is a distribution of native endowments, 
those who have the same level of talent and ability and the same willing-
ness to use these gifts should have the same prospects of success regard-
less of their social class of origin.”71 
Translating the equal opportunity principle from the political to the 
corporate sphere may suggest that corporate policies should strive for 
principles of diverse employment, ensuring that the corporation hires 
minorities, for example, in managerial positions rather than as blue-collar 
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laborers. It may also imply that hiring and promoting policies should be 
sensitive to the Part that women are allowed to play in the corporate hi-
erarchy. Just as the equal liberties principle discussed above serves as a 
“justice constraint” on the board’s discretion, the principle of equal op-
portunity ensures that a broader social view guides corporate deci-
sionmaking to include all of the corporation’s constituencies. Given the 
immense influence that corporate practices have on the labor market or 
on the social position of women, placing such restraints on corporate pol-
icies seems necessary to get just results. 
(b). The Difference Principle 
Rawls’s difference principle mandates that a corporation may carry 
out an unequal policy only if the inequality favors the worse-off.72 Even 
in cases where a certain production policy is more efficient in the sense 
that it increases the total benefits of production, the difference principle 
may prevent it from being implemented if the gains produced by this pol-
icy benefit only the better-off at the expense of the worse-off.73 
Applying the difference principle to the decisionmaking process of 
the board may suggest that some unequal managerial practices, if they 
only benefit the advantaged team members, should be barred. Thus, a 
decision to increase the remuneration of the company’s high earners be-
yond a certain point, making the inequalities between them and other 
team members greater, may not be allowed because it is an unequal 
move that does not benefit the worse-off. This may require that any in-
crease in pay to the firm’s advantaged must be linked to a similar raise in 
pay for the worse-off. Only then does the pay raise meet the qualification 
that the inequality must favor the worse-off. The difference principle 
might also apply to the board’s decisions where the board decides to shut 
down or relocate a plant. While this is possibly an efficient move, in cer-
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tain cases it may be prohibited if it harms the worse-off team members. 
In such cases, the board may have to consider, as part of its legal duties, 
not only the implications of such a move for the efficiency of production 
and the total increase in profits, but also the ramifications for the worse-
off. 
The decision to demolish two steel plants in Youngstown, Ohio in 
the 1980s provides a good example.74 The board of directors of United 
States Steel decided to close the two plants, rejecting other options such 
as selling them to the workers. The board’s decision had considerable 
ramifications, not only for the workers, but for the entire Youngstown 
community.75 The court, discussing the case, even stated that 
[f]or all of the years United States Steel has been operating in 
Youngstown, it has been a dominant factor in the lives of its thou-
sands of employees and their families, and in the life of the city it-
self. The contemplated abrupt departure of United States Steel from 
Youngstown will, of course, have direct impact on 3,500 workers 
and their families. It will doubtless mean a devastating blow to 
them, to the business community and to the City of Youngstown it-
self.76 
The court focused on the question of ownership and control, having to 
decide between the workers’ right to buy the plants and the company’s 
freedom to control its assets. While the court sympathized with the 
workers’ situation, it nevertheless followed the idea of the corporation as 
the owner of the plants, and the shareholders as the owners of the corpo-
ration, and therefore decided that the firm had no legal obligation to sell 
the plants to the workers. As the owner, the corporation through its board 
was entitled to handle its property as it wished.77 
Authors, such as Singer, criticized the court’s decision by arguing 
that the relationship between the constituencies of the corporation could 
have been legally recognized as a property right.78 The court, he claims, 
should have interpreted the law as recognizing a property right for the 
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workers, possibly by finding a right of first refusal of either the workers’ 
union or the town. 
The proposal here, to restrain the board’s decisionmaking in cases 
such as this by applying Rawls’s principles of justice to the process, may 
tip the law in a desirable direction. As described above, in a case such as 
that of Youngstown, Ohio, the difference principle may prohibit the 
board from pursuing a possibly more efficient business decision, but one 
that harms the worse-off team members (in this case, the workers and the 
town itself). Current legal doctrine, which allows companies to make 
such an ominous decision for workers and communities, to the benefit 
and profit of other team members (shareholders), needs to be amended. 
By complementing the team production model with Rawlsian principles 
of justice and designing the legal rules anew, we can achieve a change 
for the better. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The team production model of the corporation views the various 
stakeholders of the firm as members of a team, stressing the team-
specific efforts of all its stakeholders as necessary for the team to flour-
ish. This view signifies a much-needed shift away from the conservative 
principal–agent model of the firm, allowing a broader view of the corpo-
rate entity: one that takes into account not just capital, but also labor and 
community as equally important contributors to the corporate project. A 
major drawback of the team production model, however, is its disregard 
for improving the distributional outcomes of the board’s decisionmaking. 
In order to fully realize its progressive promise, the team production 
model needs to be complemented with a fair distribution mechanism that 
ensures that the board’s decisionmaking process not only reflects the rel-
ative bargaining power that each group of members has, but also takes 
just distribution into account in a meaningful way. This Article has sug-
gested that this goal may be achieved by applying Rawls’s principles of 
justice to the board’s decisionmaking. Curbing the board’s discretion 
with Rawlsian principles of justice may not only lead to a better, fairer 
redistribution of benefits that accrue from the corporate project, but it 
may also signify a break from a narrow view of the corporation as a 
wealth-maximizing mechanism for the better-off members of society, 
towards its reformulation as a just social institution. 
